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More than one year after the COVID-19 hit Europe, the 
pandemic is still raging, with the 
third even more deadly wave. The 
state of emergency has regrettably 
not stopped EU member states 
from engaging in age old political 
blame games against the European 
Commission. Accusing President 
Ursula von der Leyen (vdL) of 
failing to effectively manage the 
procurement of enough life-
saving vaccines just serves as 
another, though probably more 
consequential example. Even 
though member states mandated 
vdL to negotiate (not sign!) advance 
purchase agreements with the 
pharmaceutical industry, national 
interference to buy less expensive 
doses instead of cutting-edge 
products proved critical to creating 
an EU-wide supply shortage. 
This lack of real supranational 
centralization in public health, 
though in line with Art. 168 TFEU, 
represents an obstacle in need of 
being addressed by the upcoming 
Future of Europe Conference. 
It bears no wonder that vaccine 
disputes had an inhibiting impact 
on the delivery of the Commission’s 
work program. Yet we could see 
the first white smoke on the EU’s 
planned health union as the 5.1 
billion euro-heavy EU4Health 
program to boost the resilience of 
national health systems entered into 
force in March 2021 (Regulation 
(EU) 2021/522). It was based on 
a Commission Proposal  from 
May 2020 (COM(2020) 405 final) 
Another point of success is the fact 
that the EU is the biggest donor 
in the global vaccine alliance 
COVAX. Future EU member 
states such as North Macedonia 
have already benefited from this. 
However, vaccine exports are not 
the only currency by which von 
der Leyen’s geopolitical ambitions 
needs to be measured. The new 
Biden Administration has opened 
a window of opportunity for 
the international realization of 
the European Green Deal and 
for pushing a global democracy 
agenda. Regrettably, this is put at 
risk by von der Leyen’s reluctance 
to immediately enforce the agreed 
rule of law budget conditionality 
mechanism (Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) 2020/2092) against ruling 
autocrats at home, as the binding law 
would require as of the 1st of January 
2021.  The decision to suspend the 
application of the RoL-Mechanism 
until pending court cases against it 
at the EU Court of Justice will be 
settled is even more unfortunate 
as the Commission successfully 
shepherded through an “EU 
Magnitsky Act” to sanction human 
rights abusers abroad. (Council 
Regulation (EU) 2020/1998) 
As in previous years, the Center for 
European Integration Studies (ZEI) 
will continue tracing the progress 
of  EU legislation by way of the ZEI 
Monitor which provides a useful 
gateway for doing in-depth research 
on the European Commission’s 
annual work  programs until 
2024. Our affiliated Research 
and Master of European Studies-
Fellows, as well as Alumni will 
form a crucial part of this venture. 
Dr. Robert Stüwe, Research Fellow 
at the Center for European Integration 
Studies (ZEI), University of  Bonn.
  Von der Leyen: Still Caught in Corona Calamities  This issue of the ZEI Future of Europe Observer takes stock of 
the implementation of the von der 
Leyen-Commission‘s 2020 work 
program as part of ZEI‘s reframed  
research project on “Governance and 
Regulation in the European Union”. 
Visualized by the ZEI Monitor traffic 
lights, this magazine  includes analyses 
on the progress being made in the 
Commission‘s six policy priorities.  
Legislative proposal 
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Goals and Key Players
Since the presentation of the European Green Deal in December 2019, swiftly followed by the presenta-
tion of the European Green Deal Investment Plan and 
the Just Transition Mechanism, a number of initiatives 
and proposals have been made. Moreover, the Euro-
pean Commission has continued to see the European 
Green Deal as a strategy for growth, even a model for 
economic recovery in light of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(European Parliament, 2020). The fact that the Green 
Deal has been allocated to an Executive Vice-Presi-
dent in the person of Frans Timmermans underlines 
the high priority the Commission places on this issue. 
In contrast to the Juncker Commission (2014-2019), 
Executive Vice Presidents 
have direct authority over 
a Commission Director-
ate-General. In the case of 
Timmermans, it is the DG 
Climate Action reporting to 
him, whereas Energy Com-
missioner Kadri Simson is 
in charge of the DG Ener-
gy. (European Commission 
2019a) Both Commissioners 
are part of the Green Deal’s 
‘Project Team’ set up for 
coordinating the pertinent 
policies.  
Progress
Thus, despite initial caution 
on legislative progress in the 
various policy areas as well as a revision in general due 
to the prioritization of the ongoing health crisis, adop-
tion of new initiatives has been achieved, in particu-
lar the European Climate Law (European Commission 
2020a, European Commission 2020b), which is cur-
rently being negotiated by the Council and the Europe-
an Parliament.  
At first glance von der Leyen’s Commission appears to 
have created a virtuous cycle for the European Green 
Deal with on the one hand having formed a European 
Climate Pact with an engaged European public, which 
was launched in December 2020. On the other hand, 
leadership has been shown and commitments have 
been endorsed to climate neutrality by setting legally 
binding objectives. A fine line must still be walked here 
as the EU should maintain if not increase inclusion of 
global partners, especially with regards to its industrial 
strategies as well as its strategy for an integrated energy 
system, and not pre-emptively excluding global part-
ners through the EU Emission Trading System (Reiners 
& Grimm 2020, European Parliament 2020).
In essence the European Green Deal strives for a vir-
tuous cycle of economic sustainability simultaneous 
to environmental sustainability, underpinned by suffi-
cient funds and financing tools for an inclusive tran-
sition. 2020 has seen the majority of progress made by 
the European Commission on the economic side of 
this equation without discounting for ongoing prog-
ress such as launching the European Climate Pact or 
the adoption of a biodiversity strategy (European Com-
mission 2020c), which was done in parallel to the farm-
to-fork strategy to be mutually reinforcing (European 
Commission 2020d). 
Regarding the European In-
dustrial Strategy, climate neu-
trality is to go hand in hand 
with digital leadership striv-
ing for a globally competitive, 
green and digital Europe (Eu-
ropean Commission 2020e). 
It is foreseen to build indus-
trial alliances in this field with 
industry specific initiatives 
such as on batteries (Europe-
an Battery Alliance launched 
in 2017), plastics (Circular 
Plastics Alliance launched 
in 2018) and microelectron-
ics (Microelectronics Cloud 
Alliance as part of the Pact 
for Skills planned for 2021) 
(ibid.). These initiatives are to 
be extended for a European 
Clean Hydrogen Alliance (launched July 2020) and a 
European Raw Materials Alliance (launched September 
2020), among others. With European firms consisting 
to 99 per cent of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), the European Commission seeks to support 
and facilitate these throughout the transition to a com-
petitive, green and digital Europe. Three major focal 
areas have been identified to achieve this. Firstly, digi-
talization itself will be promoted with the appointment 
of Sustainability Advisors to help improve access to 
various skills, Digital Innovation Hubs will be set up to 
integrate digital innovations and funding will be made 
available through the new European Innovation Coun-
cil (European Commission 2020f). Secondly, actions 
are to be undertaken addressing challenges to market 
access, in particular regarding bureaucracy with a Late 
Payment Directive and an EU Start-Up Nations Stan-
dard aligning administrative procedures (ibid.). Third-
ly access to finance is to be supported and facilitated by 
creating an SME Initial Public Offering and by boosting 
the share of venture capital investments (ibid.). Also, 
ZEI Monitor 
EU Commission Work Program 2020
The European Green Deal    
Financing the sustainable 
transition
Sustainable production and 
consumption
Protecting our Environment 
Sustainable and smart mobility
Commission Priority 1: The European Green Deal 
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on the level of producer and consumer the European 
Commission acknowledges room for improvements to 
a better integrated single market. Key steps are to be 
taken in order to iron out remaining barriers through-
out the supply chain from the perspective of both the 
business entity as well as the end-consumer (European 
Commission 2020g). Part and parcel of this is a long-
term Action Plan for better implementation and en-
forcement of single market rules (ibid.). Within the sin-
gle market, competition policy is seen as a cornerstone 
to success. This is foreseen to have sustainable spillover 
effects to enable fair global competition (ibid.).
The second broad policy area in which the European 
Commission has achieved a number of accomplish-
ments throughout 2020 is that of clean energy, specif-
ically the strategies for an EU Energy System Integra-
tion Strategy. Not only is decarbonization of energy in 
itself seen as critical to achieving climate objectives, but 
also establishing a fully integrated, interconnected and 
digitalized EU energy market is a key principle (Euro-
pean Commission 2019b). Energy poverty is to be pri-
oritized by ensuring that an integrated EU energy mar-
ket provides a secure and affordable supply of energy, 
in which energy efficiency and renewable sources are 
further key tenets (ibid.).  
In correspondence with progress made in industrial 
strategies of the European Green Deal, clean hydrogen 
production guided by the EU Hydrogen Strategy will 
play a central role in the EU‘s integrated energy system 
(European Commission 2020h). The aim of investing 
in a European hydrogen ecosystem is twofold. On the 
one hand, there are numerous application possibilities 
as a feedstock, a fuel or an energy carrier and storage. 
On the other hand, exactly these applications are most 
useful in traditionally hard-to-decarbonize sectors on 
a large scale that are energy intense such as industry, 
transport and building (ibid.). As a result, the Europe-
an Commission views hydrogen as an investment pri-
ority in its recovery plan in order to create local jobs 
and to boost economic growth and resilience (ibid.). 
In addition to adapting new energy practices more 
conducive to achieving climate neutrality, the Green 
Deal includes mitigating its carbon footprint by reduc-
ing methane emissions. One such initiative is the EU 
Methane Strategy with a cross-sectoral approach, i.e. 
in the energy, agricultural and waste sectors in par-
ticular, and use of synergies (European Commission 
2020i). Cross-sectoral actions are to include improved 
detection, monitoring and reporting of methane emis-
sions by companies, observatories and satellite data; a 
thorough review of relevant EU climate and environ-
mental legislation; and supporting the acceleration of a 
biogas market from sustainable resources (ibid.). Com-
plementing the cross-sectoral actions are sector specif-
ic initiatives. A third considerable element of the EU‘s 
Energy System Integration Strategy is the development 
of offshore renewable energy (European Commission 
2020j), which is to become a core component, with a 
diversified approach in technologies in order to harness 
all of the EU‘s sea basins (ibid.). Regional cooperation 
and a predictable legal framework are therefore essen-
tial to scale up offshore renewable energy deployment. 
The European Commission plans to scale up wind 
energy capacity from currently 12 GW to 300 GW by 
2050 and scale up ocean capacity, including wave and 
tidal technologies, from currently 13 MW to 40 GW by 
2050 (European Commission 2020k).
Conclusion
In short, developments in initiatives and progress in 
legislation within the European Commission‘s first pri-
ority during 2020 reflect a continued vision of striving 
for a virtuous cycle of economic growth while environ-
mentally sustainable, with a view to an inclusive soci-
ety. For 2021, Brexit will be a fact, Joe Biden has brought 
the US back into the Paris agreement, and perhaps the 
COVID-19 pandemic can be referred to in past-tense. 
The prospects appear bright for the European Green 
Deal.
Aiveen Donnelly is a ZEI Master Alumna “Class of 2016“.
Commission Priority 1: The European Green Deal 
The Juncker Commission. Politicizing EU 
Policies, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 2020.
This book, edited by Robert Stüwe and Thomas Panayotopoulos, 
is the first comprehensive analysis of President Juncker‘s self-
proclaimed “Political Commission“ between 2014 and 2019. 
Based on its ten policy priorities, which the Commission 
retained in all of its annual work programs,  the authors analyze 
its strategies of dealing with the politicization of European 
integration. The conclusion is ambiguous: The Juncker 
Commission sought to use politicized issues as an opportunity 
to hone its institutional profile. Yet controversies and crises 
repeatedly forced it to resort to damage control.
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It has been one year now since the last update on the Commission Priority 2 (see ZEI Future of Europe 
Observer Vol. 8 No. 1 April 2020). One year of the von 
der Leyen-Commission being in office. But also one 
year of the COVID-19 pandemic that hit the European 
Union hard. Amid these tough times the Commission 
had to face many new challenges besides the six Com-
mission Priorities for 2019-2024, which were identified 
in July 2019 (when no one could imagine the persistent 
global health crisis). Nevertheless, it is time to review the 
Commission’s first year in office. All things considered 
it can be said that the Commission has done a good job 
when it comes to the ful-
filment of the EU’s digital 
strategy. Mainly respon-
sible for digital affairs are 
the Commissioners Mar-
grethe Vestager as Exec-
utive Vice-President and 
Thierry Breton in charge 
of the Internal Market. 




The major goal of the 
Commission is to make 
this the ‘’Digital Decade’’ 
for Europe. Therefore, 
the Commission’s work 
is aimed at strengthen-
ing Europe’s digital sov-
ereignty and at setting 
standards with a clear 
focus on data, technology 
and infrastructure. The 
key actions of the Com-
mission were presented 
on the 19th of February 
2020, when it published 
a Communication on shaping Europe’s digital future 
(COM (2020) 67 final). The Commission established 
three main pillars, on which its work will focus over 
the next five years. In 2020, the first two of the main 
pillars became the focal points: 
Technology that works for people. Bringing forward 
digitalization in the European Union should make a 
real difference to people’s daily lives. The development 
and deployment of new technologies aims to work for 
all people and therefore should have a positive impact 
in all life situations. In this respect, the Commission 
especially focuses on the issue of Europe’s Gigabit con-
nectivity, which is the major goal of the Gigabit Com-
munication, published on the 14th of September 2016 
(COM(2016) 587 final). In order to establish Gigabit 
connectivity for all Europeans, the acceleration of in-
vestments in Europe’s gigabit connectivity has been 
one of the key actions of the Commission.
A fair and competitive economy. The European Sin-
gle Market should be adapted to the new conditions of 
digitalization in the European Union. The goal is to 
build up a frictionless digital single market with a com-
petitive environment that brings benefits for both com-
panies and consumers. On 
the one hand, companies 
should develop and use 
digital technologies and 
data at a scale that boosts 
their productivity and 
competitiveness. On the 
other hand, consumers 
should be confident that 
their rights are respected 
when it comes to the us-
age of data. To reach this 
goal, a legal framework for 
the governance of common 





1. Technology that 
works for people
The first strategic objec-
tive of the Gigabit Com-
munication 2016 is to pro-
vide Gigabit connectivity 
(at least 1.000 Mbps) for 
all main socio-economic 
drivers such as schools, 
transport hubs and main providers of public services 
as well as digitally intensive enterprises. The second 
strategic objective is to ensure that all urban areas and 
all major terrestrial transport paths have uninterrupted 
5G coverage. And third, all European households, ru-
ral or urban, should have access to internet connectivi-
ty, offering a downlink of at least 100 Mbps, upgradable 
to Gigabit speed. 
The Digital Economy and Society Index Report 2020 
(DESI 2020 – Connectivity) shows that the European 
Union is on a good path when it comes to the fulfil-
ment of the strategic objectives.  In 2019, next gener-
Commission Priority 2: A Europe Fit for the Digital Age
ZEI Monitor
EU Commission Work Program 2020
Europe Fit for the Digital Age 
A European Approach to Artificial 
Intelligence
Digital Services and Digital Markets Act
Increasing cybersecurity 
Digital policy for consumers
A new industrial strategy for Europe 
Aviation services package
Towards a European Research Area
Digital finance
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ation access (NGA) coverage increased to 86 per cent 
of households while fixed very high capacity networks 
(VHCNs) were available to 44 per cent.  However, it is 
still a long way to reach all of these strategic objectives, 
especially when it comes to rural areas. Basically, pri-
vate sector investments always have priority as Art. 107 
(1) TFEU generally prohibits the granting of financial 
aid to undertakings by the state pursuant. Therefore, 
the establishment of the European Electronic Commu-
nications Code (EECC) is an important step towards 
Europe’s Gigabit connectivity by enhancing investment 
incentives with an updated regulatory framework in a 
competitive environment. In addition to this, the Com-
mission published a Recommendation on Connectivity 
on the 19th of September 2020 (C(2020) 6270 final). The 
recommendation addresses the member states and in-
vites them to work together to develop best practices 
and measures that will reduce the costs of network de-
ployment and therefore enhance investment incentives 
for private investors. The goal is to develop a Connec-
tivity Toolbox to foster EU-wide advanced connectivity.
Financial state aid remains an important factor when 
it comes to the rollout of 5G and fibre networks. Al-
though, financial state aid has the potential to cause dis-
tortions of competition, it can fill investment gaps and 
thus help contribute to the fast establishment of EU-
wide advanced connectivity. Therefore, financial state 
aid can be accepted according to Art. 107 (3) TFEU by 
a decision of the Commission. Until now, the Commis-
sion has always decided on the basis of the EU Guide-
lines for the application of State aid rules in relation to 
the rapid deployment of broadband networks (2013/C 
25/01), which were published on the 26th of January 
2013. To update these guidelines, the Commission 
launched a public consultation on the 8th of September 
2020, inviting member states and other stakeholders to 
provide their views and comments on the existing EU 
state aid rules on public support for the deployment of 
broadband networks. Interested parties could respond 
to the consultation until the 5th of January 2021. The 
goal is to update the EU Guidelines in reaction to the 
new challenges of Europe’s digital future. 
2. A fair and competitive economy
When it comes to the establishment of a fair and com-
petitive economy in a frictionless digital single market, 
a legal framework for the governance of common Europe-
an data spaces is essential. Therefore, the Commission’s 
work in 2020 mainly focused on setting up such a legal 
framework. On the 19th of February 2020, the Commis-
sion published a European Data Strategy (COM(2020) 
66 final). Subsequently, two proposals for a Regulation 
were released on the 15th of December 2020. (ZEI Mon-
itor 2019-2024 - Commission Priority 2)
The first proposal of the Commission (Digital Services 
Act – COM(2020) 825 final) covers basic rules for a dig-
ital single market such as obligations for intermediaries 
and providers. Therefore, the Digital Services Act con-
tains clear rules for the provision of intermediary ser-
vices, hosting services and online platforms. The new 
obligations should establish better protection of con-
sumers and their fundamental rights during the use of 
online services. Besides, a powerful transparency and 
a clear accountability framework for online platforms 
should be granted. Furthermore, the Digital Services 
Act aims to foster innovation, growth and competitive-
ness within the digital single market.
The second proposal of the Commission (Digital Mar-
kets Act - COM(2020) 842 final) contains special rules 
on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector. 
These special rules of the Digital Markets Act apply to 
so-called gatekeepers. A gatekeeper is defined as a pro-
vider with a strong economic and intermediation posi-
tion, which causes a significant impact on the internal 
market. Typically, a gatekeeper has a position that is 
comparable with the dominant market position in Art. 
102 (1) TFEU. Therefore, the special obligations for gate-
keepers that are established in the Digital Markets Act 
are aimed to control the dominant market positions in 
the new digital single market. The goal of this Regula-
tion is to create new opportunities for competitors. 
Conclusion and Outlook: Europe‘s digital 
future in 2021
In 2020, the Commission made some big achievements on 
the way to establish a Europe Fit for the Digital Age. The 
ongoing progress regarding the acceleration of investments 
in Europe’s Gigabit connectivity will speed up the rollout of 
5G and fibre networks. In addition, the Digital Services Act 
and the Digital Markets Act provide an important basis for a 
common legal framework in the digital single market.
In 2021 we can expect further important steps on the 
way to Europe’s Gigabit Connectivity. The development of 
a Connectivity toolbox and the results of the consultation 
regarding the EU Guidelines might have a big impact on the 
future of both private investments and financial state aid.
Moreover, we can expect a proposal of the Commission for 
a Data Act in the first quarter of 2021. The Data Act will be 
an essential part of the legal framework for the governance 
of common European data spaces and expand the common 
set of rules that were proposed by the Commission in 2020. 
All in all, the Commission’s proposals will be a huge step 
into a frictionless and competitive digital single market. 
Carlos Deniz Cesarano is a ZEI Research Fellow and a PhD 
candidate in Law at the University of Bonn under the super-
vision of  ZEI-Director Professor Christian Koenig. 
Commission Priority 2: A Europe Fit for the Digital Age 
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Goals and Key Players
The European Green Deal announced by the Eu-ropean Commission (EC) in December 2019 is a 
long-term plan to make the EU‘s economy sustainable 
by 2050. However, the rapidly changing economic envi-
ronment and the uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 
have prompted the European Commission to plan and 
present alternative solutions to manage the likely eco-
nomic impact of the pandemic.
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) has taken action in a range of ar-
eas, from the provision of medical supplies, assistance 
to EU citizens stranded in third countries, the removal 
of obstacles to the move-
ment of EU goods in the 
Single Market and the 
long-term economic re-
sponse. In the first stage, 
it was important to man-
age the health crisis, so 
measures were aimed at 
strengthening health care 
systems, preserving jobs, 
and helping businesses. 
Not only is how to ease 
restrictions in a coordi-
nated way currently being 
deliberated, but also what 
response measures will 
be needed in the long-
term. It should also be 
noted that the EU is also 
taking steps to strength-
en its global response to 
COVID-19.
Progress in 2020
The European Union‘s economy is projected to have 
shrunk by 7.4 per cent in 2020, according to the data 
platform Statista. Individual countries will experi-
ence different economic developments. Spain’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) will likely decline by 12.4 
per cent, while Lithuania will experience the smallest 
shrinkage with a downturn of  2.2 per cent according 
to this estimate (Statista - November 2020).
On the 27th of May 2020, the EC adopted three key 
actions to address the socio-economic consequences 
of Covid-19 in the European Union . It was decided to 
increase the ceilings for the 2014-2020 Multiannual Fi-
nancial Framework (COM(2020) 446 final) to strength-
en the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 
(COM(2020) 443 final) and to establish a European 
Union Recovery Instrument (COM(2020) 441 final/2) 
(called „Next Generation EU“). The EC has proposed to 
allow all unspent European Structural and Investment 
Funds money to be used in response to COVID-19: 
maximum flexibility – with no restrictions on trans-
fers between funds and regions, no requirements for 
thematic concentration and national co-financing. This 
makes it easier and faster to implement projects and 
speed up the investment of EU funds.
The EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-
2027 budget, the Recovery and Resilience Facility 
(RRF) in 2021 and the temporary instruments add to a 
sum of 1.8 trillion euro with the main aim of rebuild-
ing a post-COVID-19 Europe. 
The RRF seeks to bring about further economic re-
covery. Under this facility, 
672.5 billion euro will be 
provided until the 31st of 
December 2026, as Art. 3 
of the Council Regulation 
(EU) 2020/2094 on the 
Recovery Instrument sets 
out. The grand total is split 
into loans of up to 360 bil-
lion euro, grants amount-
ing to  384.4 billion euro 
and budget guarantees 
of up to 5.6 billion euro. 
(ZEI Monitor 2019-2024 - 
Commission Priority 3)  
The new initiative RE-
ACT EU, which is placed 
within the “NextGenera-
tionEU” program includes 
a budget of 47.5 billion 
euro and aims to contrib-
ute to a green, digital and 
resilient recovery of the economy. At the same time, it 
extends the crisis response measures delivered through 
the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative and 
the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus. 
This financial support will be made available through 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Fund 
for Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD). 
“NextGenerationEU” will also provide financial sup-
port to other European initiatives such as Horizon2020, 
InvestEU, rural development and the Just Transition 
Fund (JTF). The goal and guiding principles of Next-
GenerationEU are environmental sustainability, pro-
ductivity, equity and macroeconomic stability. This 
needs to be reflected in each member state’s recovery 
and resilience plan in which individual national reform 
and investments plans have to be proposed to the Com-
mission for approval. 
Commission Priority 3: An Economy that Works for People
ZEI Monitor 
EU Commission Work Program 2020
Social Europe: SURE-Instrument
Economic Governance: Next Generation EU 
Deepening the Capital Markets Union 
Completing the Banking Union 
Effective Taxation
Customs Union Package 
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The EC urges member states to address the following 
areas in particular (European Commission 2020):
a) Power up: advancing the financing of promising 
clean technologies and accelerating the development 
and use of renewable energy sources; b) Renovation - 
improving the energy efficiency of public and private 
buildings; c) Charging and refuelling - promoting 
promising clean technologies to accelerate the use of 
sustainable, accessible and intelligent transport and 
refuelling and refuelling points and the development 
of public transport; d) Connect - rapid deployment 
of high-speed broadband services in all regions and 
households, including fiber-optic and 5G networks; e) 
Modernize - digitization of public administration and 
services, including the judiciary and health care sys-
tems; f) Scale-up - increasing the cloud capacity of Eu-
ropean industrial data and building the most powerful, 
advanced and sustainable processors; g) Reskill and 
upskill - adapting education systems to support digital 
skills and education and training for all ages.
Another important field of economic recovery that 
should receive more attention is social protection and 
employment retention. The Coronavirus pandemic and 
restrictive measures taken by national governments 
created significant employment problems. The crisis 
has changed the labor market. Indeed, some businesses 
will never reopen. However, a clear change - the transi-
tion to a digital workplace - has provided opportunities 
for some businesses. The figures show that the situation 
in EU labor markets differs. Unemployment across the 
whole of the European Union is expected to rise to 8.6 
per cent in 2021. Among EU countries, Spain is expect-
ed to suffer the worst unemployment rate at 17.9 per 
cent, followed by Greece at 17.5 per cent. The lowest un-
employment rate is forecasted for the Czech Republic 
with 3.3 per cent (Statista - February 2021).
To ease these problems, the Commission proposed 
the labor market solidarity instrument SURE for miti-
gating unemployment risks in an emergency (Council 
Regulation 2020/672). SURE’s regulations allow the EC 
to issue social bonds on the capital market in order to 
collect money.  After coming into effect on the 20th of 
May 2020, the instrument for facilitating short-term 
work provides loans to member states and sets up a 
maximum amount of 100 billion euro to help business-
es retain workers whose incomes are being paid from 
SURE.  Financial assistance provided via this instru-
ment is to support the creation or extension of short 
time work schemes in the member states and other 
similar measures including for self-employed workers. 
Another way to safeguard jobs is to subsidize worker 
wages and incomes by compensating those who have 
lost work due to the crisis. However, the eligibility cri-
teria for access to employee and self-employed income 
support schemes have been adopted differently by 
member states with regard to the minimum require-
ments to be met by companies and workers. Such a di-
vergence in rules may affect the expected results of the 
measures. 
Conclusion
Some countries have been harder hit economically by 
COVID-19. Explanations as to why this happened can 
be provided: the severity of lockdown measures, the 
structure of national economies, the fiscal capacity of 
governments to counter the collapse in economic ac-
tivity and the quality of governance in different coun-
tries (Sapir 2020). Despite the fact that the GDP is now 
forecasted to grow by 3.7 per cent in 2021 and 3.9 per 
cent in 2022 in the EU and by 3.8 per cent in both years 
in the euro area, the speed of the recovery will vary 
significantly across the EU. It needs to be emphasized 
that differences between member states could become 
entrenched and cause deeper economic and social gaps 
than seen before. (Euronews 2021)  The long-term suc-
cess of recovery at the national and European level will 
depend on the various factors mentioned above.
Outlook 2021
Under the European Recovery Instrument, the EC 
aims to borrow 750 billion euro from the capital mar-
kets to support economic recovery in the EU.  The RRF 
plans should enable member states to increase their 
growth potential, job creation and economic and social 
resilience, as well as to adapt to green and digital trans-
formation. The fact that money for loans and subsidies 
to EU countries will be lent on behalf of the European 
Commission, and the fact that the European Central 
Bank has decided to expand its stimulus measures, will 
reduce market pressure for some peripheral euro area 
countries with very difficult public finances.
Importantly, the European Semester and the new Re-
covery and Resilience Instrument are linked. Recovery 
and resilience plans will be assessed in the light of the 
country-specific recommendations. The National Re-
form Programmes and recovery and resilience plans 
are called to be presented in a single integrated docu-
ment. The integration of the planned activities makes 
it possible to emphasize the involvement of member 
states in a wide-ranging dialogue with social partners 
and all other stakeholders in order to prepare proper 
recovery and resilience plans. The implementation of 
the NextGenerationEU program, including its Recov-
ery and Resilience Facility, should provide a strong 
boost to the EU economy. 
Prof. Dr. Daiva Dumčiuviene is a ZEI Senior Fellow and 
Chairwoman of the Doctoral Committee of Economics, 
Kaunas University of Technology, Lituania. 
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2020 - What a Geopolitical Year for the 
EU!
1. Goals and Opportunities
In 2019, the newly appointed Von der Leyen Europe-an Commission vowed to adopt a more “geopoliti-
cal” posture, given the return of Great Power politics 
on the world stage. This step has met with general 
enthusiasm, although some have warned that such a 
move goes against the EU’s political DNA, weakening 
its track record as a “civilian power” (Lehne 2020). The 
EU’s ambition to join the 
geopolitical power game 
does not come as a sur-
prise. The 2016 Global 
Strategy already made a 
commitment to base EU 
foreign and security poli-
cy on the notion of “prin-
cipled pragmatism.” A 
first sign that Realpolitik 
will indeed guide the EU 
emerged in March 2019 
(six months before the 
Von der Leyen Commis-
sion took office), when 
the EU’s China Strategy 
labelled China a “strate-
gic rival” that needs to 
be confronted with an as-
sertive and coherent EU 
posture.
How has the Von der 
Leyen Commission fared 
in its pivot towards geo-
politics? 2020 has proven 
an exceptional year, and 
both a bane and a blessing for the “Geopolitical Com-
mission.” On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandem-
ic has strengthened nationalism among EU member 
states, who, in times of crisis, have mainly looked for 
national solutions within harder borders. On the other 
hand, the pandemic has offered the EU an opportunity 
to stand up against both China and Trump’s US, main-
ly by taking a more hard-nosed approach to trade poli-
cy as a “geopolitical instrument that the EU can use to 
leverage its influence in the global economy” (Macyra 
2020). The pandemic revealed vulnerabilities in access 
to key medical supplies and strengthened calls for EU 
resilience in critical industries’ supply chains, for ex-
ample by near- or reshoring “essential” equipment and 
services. The Commission’s role in managing the joint 
purchase of personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
vaccines, and brokering a post-COVID economic stim-
ulus for struggling member states, has reinforced its 
position. Some pundits even concluded that the pan-
demic has roused a “sleeping giant”, heralding “Eu-
rope’s geopolitical awakening”(Bergmann 2020).
This conclusion is flawed, and too cheerful. The follow-
ing section briefly examines the main achievements 
and challenges of the “Geopolitical Commission.”
2. 2020 - Progress and Challenges
The overview should begin in the EU’s direct vicini-
ty, with Belarus and the 
Western Balkans. Clearly, 
the EU cannot look with 
great pride on its response 
to the crisis that flared up 
in Belarus, after the coun-
try’s botched and violent 
presidential elections in 
August. The EU has tra-
ditionally used econom-
ic sanctions and threats 
to coax Belarus to adopt 
democratic standards and 
increase its detachment 
from its Russian over-
lords. The rise of a vocal 
and courageous civil so-
ciety standing up against 
President Alexander Lu-
kashenka’s autocratic 
rule seemed to offer the 
EU a lever to reach these 
strategic goals. Hawk-
ish member states such 
as Poland and Lithuania 
called for broad econom-
ic sanctions on Belarus; a 
new EU-Belarus trade deal post-Lukashenka; offering 
support to protesters; as well as a clear commitment 
for the country’s “European future.” Most European 
leaders, and hence the European Council, proved ret-
icent to go beyond a “European Magnitsky Act” (ad-
opted on 7 December 2020, which envisions visa-bans 
and asset-freezes targeting individuals guilty of crimes 
against humanity), in order to put pressure on the Lu-
kashenka-regime. If the Belarus crisis proved anything, 
it is that the EU is internally divided on how to deal 
with challenges in its direct strategic backyard, and 
that member states remain reluctant to delegate foreign 
and security policy to the largely invisible “Foreign Pol-
icy czar” Josep Borrell.
Commission Priority 4: A Stronger Europe in the World
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The EU’s approach towards the Western Balkans has 
been hectic and disjointed. At the start of the pandem-
ic, regional media reported the arrival of medical as-
sistance from China and Russia, whereas the EU had 
issued an export ban (on the 19th of March 2020) on 
personal medical equipment to third countries (in-
cluding the Western Balkans). Only after severe pub-
lic pressure did the Commission reverse its policy, and 
medical exports were released for the region. This was 
followed (in May 2020) by a significant aid package (of 
3.3 billion euro) to assist the Western Balkans to deal 
with the pandemic, and to strengthen ties with the EU. 
The Commission made it clear that the Western Bal-
kans remains a “geostrategic priority” to the EU, but 
these words rang hollow to many leaders in the region. 
The key geopolitical question regarding the Western 
Balkans also remains unresolved: Should the EU stick 
to strict conditionality on the rule of law before ac-
cepting new members, or wave them through to keep 
the region from aligning further with rivalling Great 
Powers like China and Russia? This question became 
even more problematic since Bulgaria blocked acces-
sion talks between the EU and North Macedonia (on 
8 December 2020), ostensibly due to issues related to 
“history, identity and language.”
Beyond Europe, the EU’s main geopolitical challeng-
es are China and the Middle East. China was able to 
beat the EU in its own game, by successfully conduct-
ing COVID-diplomacy (through active medical assis-
tance) towards the Middle East, the Pacific, Africa, and 
elsewhere (Bodetti 2021). This has increased China’s 
soft power and boosted its geopolitical position across 
the globe; to the detriment of the EU. The long-await-
ed EU-China trade deal (the so-called “Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment”, or CAI) was announced 
on 30 December 2020, capping Germany’s six months 
European Council Presidency. The European Commis-
sion, which negotiated the deal, was criticized for ig-
noring massive human rights violations in China. For 
some, this showed that the EU was well underway to-
wards “strategic autonomy” from the US on trade and 
foreign policy matters. The deal was announced just a 
few weeks before the Biden administration took office, 
making it impossible to formulate a new, transatlantic 
approach towards China. Italy, Poland, Belgium and 
Spain also criticized the Commission for negotiating a 
deal that did not take their national interests into ac-
count (Hanke Vela et al. 2021). Germany and France 
were blamed by these countries for side-lining smaller 
member states, which just proved that the CAI man-
aged not only to drive a wedge between the EU and the 
US, but between EU member states as well. As a result, 
the CAI is no real success-story for the “Geopolitical 
Commission.”
Finally, the usual geopolitical powder keg of the Middle 
East posed a new, and somewhat unexpected geopolit-
ical “shock” to the EU: The US Trump Administration 
proved capable of brokering unmatched peace accords 
between Israel and its Islamic neighbors. President 
Trump’s vision of flouting Iran and the Palestinians 
and bringing Israel and several Gulf and North African 
countries closer together has been a blow to the Europe-
an Commission’s confidence. The so-called “Abraham 
accords” proved that the EU’s longstanding approach 
of assuaging Iran and the Palestinians was mistaken. 
At a time when the European Commission tries to gain 
experience and a reputation as a “geopolitical player”, 
this loss of face (and faith) could not have come at a 
worst time.
3. Conclusion / Outlook
What to conclude and what awaits the Von der Ley-
en Commission? It is always gratuitous to lament the 
tortuous path of the EU towards geostrategic maturity. 
2020 should be considered as the first year of a learn-
ing curve of uncertain length and slope. The positives 
should therefore also be mentioned, mainly that a seri-
ous debate on the EU’s strategic autonomy has finally 
taken off and come into its own. Putin’s Crimea inva-
sion of 2014; Trump’s MAGA-strategy; and China’s im-
perial dreams can all take credit for Europe’s geopolit-
ical renaissance.
This debate should be intensified and broadened to the 
wider European public to earn grassroots support. HR 
Borrell may begin a review of the 2016 Global Strategy, 
based on the new realities of a post-Brexit and (hope-
fully) post-COVID Europe. But 2021 also bears risks: 
the Biden administration is likely to commit itself (rhe-
torically) to multilateralism, but also to engage in new 
military adventures (Marcetic 2018). Trump’s uncom-
promising stance towards the EU has ruffled feathers 
and kicked even the most hesitant EU-supporter into 
action. Biden may lull the EU into passivity again, and 
call for its support for future US military interventions. 
The hope is for 2021 to be a bit more boring (and pre-
dictable) than 2020. But don’t count on it.
Dr. Peter van Ham is a ZEI Senior Fellow. He works as a 
Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute in The Hague, 
Netherlands and is the editor-in-chief of the Clingendael 
Magazine for International Relations ‚ the ‚Clingendael 
Spectator‘.
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On the Road from Great Expectations 
to the First Actual Results
1. Goals and Key Players
The 5th priority of the Von der Leyen Commission sounds pompous, but despite the controversies at 
the original naming stage (cf. Trilling 2019), no deci-
sion was taken to relabel it once more. As the dedicated 
website reveals however, the emphasis does lie on not 
just promoting but actually protecting EU citizens and 
their values. Some right-wing politicians are still bound 
to be pleased with that.
Efforts under this heading are directed towards three 
main goals: 1) upholding 
the rule of law (encom-
passing judicial protec-
tion as well as fundamen-
tal rights), 2) ensuring 
strong border manage-
ment, 3) strengthening 
internal security. These 
objectives come togeth-
er in the portfolio of Mr. 
Margaritis Schinas epon-
ymous to the priority. 
While Mr. Schinas is 
to coordinate the vari-
ous activities, the organ-
ogram of his team is a 
bit fuzzy. Notably, Ms. 
Helena Dalli, Ms. Ylva 
Johansson, Mr. Didier 
Reynders and Ms. Věra 
Jourová have been appointed Commissioner for re-
spectively ‘Equality’, ‘Home Affairs’, ‘Justice’ and ‘Val-
ues’. The latter however is also a Vice-President herself 
so not subservient to Mr. Schinas. Thus, while ‘Protect-
ing the European way of life’ is the overarching theme, 
the competent Commissioner does not function as a 
true overlord for the members entrusted with directly 
connected tasks. Moreover, while the aforementioned 
portfolios are logically linked to that of Mr. Schinas, he 
is to supervise also what goes on in the spheres of ‘In-
novation, Research, Culture, Education, Youth’ (spear-
headed by Ms. Mariya Gabriel), ‘Health and Food Safe-
ty’ (overseen by Ms. Stella Kyriakides) and ‘Jobs and 
Social Rights’ (handled by Mr. Nicolas Schmit).
As it is impossible to exhaustively highlight the recent 
developments in each of these areas, this update is lim-
ited to three prominent dossiers where genuine move-
ment was visible.
Progress in 2020
The Juncker Commission prepared the ground for a 
series of projects in this domain which fit well into the 
agenda of Ms. Von der Leyen. Though in the first half of 
2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caught the lead actors 
by surprise and totally disrupted the ‘European way of 
life, their work certainly did not grind to a halt.
The new asylum and migration pact
On the 23rd of September, the Commission unveiled 
its new ‘pact on migration and asylum’, which had been 
a long time in the making. As Mr. Schinas and Ms. 
Johansson clarified in their presentations, the Com-
mission sought to learn from its mistakes in 2015/2016 
when an incomplete set of 
instruments was proposed 
that failed to propose du-
rable solutions and met 
with much scepticism and 
resistance. The novel deal, 
consisting of five draft reg-
ulations, presents a hard 
break with the Dublin 
system whereby the state 
of entry is the one respon-
sible for processing an 
asylum claim. Simultane-
ously, the idea of manda-
tory relocation quotas has 
been abandoned. Instead, 
the Pact outlines various 
conceptions of solidarity 
allowing member states to 
take in selected individu-
als, extend financial sup-
port, or offer ‘return sponsorships’ (facilitating the exit 
of persons whose claims have been rejected). Attention 
equally goes out to making arrangements with non-
EU countries on accepting returnees. As a final feature 
worth mentioning, those arriving at an external border 
are to go through security, health and identity checks 
within 5 days, followed by a 12-week procedure allow-
ing for appeals against negative decisions. This should 
eclipse the often hopeless stays in decrepit national cen-
ters like camp Moria on the isle of Lesbos. Presently the 
package is subject to further discussion in the Council 
and Parliament. 
Measures to safeguard the rule of law
At its inception, the Von der Leyen Commission 
pledged to launch a comprehensive framework under 
which it would annually assess the status quo of the 
rule of law across the Union. It was a smart move to 
place the supervision partly in the hands of the Czech 
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Ms. Jourová, alongside Mr. Reynders, considering the 
likely resistance from Central and Eastern European 
countries (de Waele 2020).
On the 30th of September, the Commission issued its 
first report, reviewing the state of play as regards the 
functioning of the judiciary, media freedoms, corrup-
tion and good governance. It rehearsed that the exer-
cise is to become a yearly exercise, aiming for early de-
tection of existing or potential issues. The 2020 report 
criticised Poland in particular, calling the threats to 
judicial independence there a serious concern. Hunga-
ry, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia were chas-
tized on similar grounds. The Commission moreover 
pointed to deficiencies in the fight against corruption 
in these countries, as well as Malta. 
The document itself alas does not lead to concrete ac-
tion against any Member State. So far it did feed into 
subsequent discussions in the Council. In addition, al-
ready in 2017 the Council agreed with the Parliament 
on the creation of a mechanism introducing ‘rule of law 
conditionality’, not only applying to cases of corrup-
tion or fraud, but also to fundamental values such as 
freedom, democracy, equality, and respect for human 
rights. This resulted in a draft regulation enabling the 
Council, upon a reasoned proposal from the Commis-
sion, to adopt measures withholding funds from back-
sliding countries by qualified majority. Despite Hun-
gary, Poland and Slovenia attempting to veto both this 
measure and the 1.85 trillion euro Multi-annual Finan-
cial Framework to which it pertains, final agreement 
was reached in the European Council on the 10th of 
December 2020. The compromise entails that the Com-
mission will prepare guidelines on the application of 
the regulation which it should not adopt or enforce un-
til after the judgment of the European Court of Justice 
on this matter. Though the European Council’s prefer-
ences are as such not binding, they found acceptance 
in the legislative trajectory. The act was adopted on the 
22nd of December 2020, entering into force on 1 Janu-
ary 2021.
Standing up for LGBTQI rights
On the 12th of November 2020, the EU reached an-
other historic milestone when it launched its first-ever 
strategy to protect the rights of LGBTQI people in Eu-
rope. This was one way to respond to their downgrad-
ing in several Member States, amongst which Hungary, 
Croatia, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Some municipalities in 
Poland have gone so far as to declare themselves ‘LGBT-
free zones’, leading to a severing of ties by partner cities, 
as well as a reprimand, cutting of funds and follow-up 
investigations by the Commission. Moreover, Ms. Jou-
rová has proposed to place homophobic hate crimes 
in the register of select offences for which the EU can 
establish minimum rules, and to arrange financial in-
centives for initiatives to combat them. Through future 
legislation, transnational recognition of child-parent 
relations in cross-border families is to be strengthened 
as well.
Conclusion
As may be clear even from this small sample, the train 
is coming up to speed, and we have moved beyond the 
stage of ‘great expectations’. 
The proposed asylum and migration pact has been 
cleverly thought out, with the flexible take on bur-
den-sharing leading commentators to believe that the 
package will be in place by 2023. A crucial objection-
able element in the plan may nevertheless turn out to 
be that if repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers proves 
unsuccessful, the member state concerned has to let the 
persons stay in their country.
The first rule of law report could usher in a new era of 
supranational monitoring. At the same time, the pro-
cess has been discredited a paper tiger, and the tem-
porary neutering of the conditionality regulation de-
scribed as a catastrophic moral failure (Morijn 2021). 
Similarly, on the LGBTI rights fronts, much will de-
pend on the next concrete steps to give teeth to the 
words on paper.
Outlook 2021
In October last year, the Commission presented its 
work programme for 2021. Special attention under 
Priority 5 is given to the building of a Health Union 
and reinforcement of the Schengen system. Also in the 
pipeline are proposals on the fight against human traf-
ficking, terrorism and antisemitism. Additional mea-
sures are foreseen on legal migration while the draft 
rules in the discussed pact make their way through the 
institutional machinery.
Rule of law monitoring will continue, whereby ques-
tions do linger on the effectiveness of the adopted re-
ports and on whether member states will make any im-
provements in the meanwhile. The Court might speak 
out shortly on the lawfulness of the conditionality reg-
ulation, so that the Commission can wrap up its guide-
lines and start applying it. Time is of the essence, espe-
cially with the next Hungarian elections slated for the 
first half of 2022. Lastly, the prospects appear bleaker 
as regards shoring up of LGBTQI rights, since adopting 
legislation on mutual recognition requires unanimity 
in the Council, which should prove difficult to attain.
Prof. Dr. Henri de Waele is a ZEI Senior Fellow, Professor 
of International and European Law, Radboud University 
Nijmegen and Guest Professor of EU External Relations Law, 
University of Antwerp.
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Commission Priority 6: A New Push for European Democracy 
Goals and Key Players 
The European Commission set itself a number of priorities in its political guidelines for the period 
of 2019-2024 (Von der Leyen 2019). In priority six it is 
proposed to give European democracy a ‘new push’. 
Building on the unique democratic system and the 
‘record-high’ high turnout in the 2019 elections, Euro-
peans are to play a stronger role in decision- making. 
The Commission stresses accordingly that ‘we will go 
further than ever before to make this happen’ (Von der 
Leyen 2019: 19).  As such citizens are to have their say at 
a Conference on the Future of Europe. This Conference 
is to bring together citizens, civil society and Europe-
an institutions as ‘equal partners’. Young people are to 
take centre stage. The (then candidate for) Commission 
President Ursula von der Leyen committed herself to 
following up on what will 
be agreed, including by 
legislative action if ap-
propriate. Even Treaty 
change was seen to be in 
the cards. 
Apart from the Confer-
ence on the Future of 
Europe, which is a cor-
nerstone of the Com-
mission’s priority, other 
proposals include the 
strengthening of the 
partnership between the 
European Commission 
and the European Par-
liament (EP). One even 
goes as far as proposing a 
right of initiative for the 
EP, which is seen as the 
‘voice of the people’. The 
way leaders are appointed 
to the top jobs in the EU institutions is also seen to be 
in need of an overhaul. The lead candidate, or Spitzen-
kandidaten, system, which builds the foundation of ap-
pointing the Commission President, is a case in point. 
Hand in hand with the revision of this system, one will 
also have to revisit the issue of transnational lists in 
the European elections. In order for Europeans to have 
faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and be-
yond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity. In 
order to ‘protect’ the Union, which in recent years has 
been subject to ‘external interference’, the Commission 
guidelines foresee that a European Democracy Action 
Plan is to be put forward (Von der Leyen 2019). 
Progress in 2020  
All three EU institutions put forward a position on 
the Conference on the Future of Europe in the course 
of 2020. The position by the European Parliament is 
generally seen as going the furthest and being the most 
detailed and methodologically sound (EPRS 2020). In 
its resolution of the 15th of January 2020, the Parliament 
strongly endorses the active participation of citizens. 
These are to debate EU policy issues – that broadly 
overlap with the Commission’s priorities - in thematic 
Agoras composed of 200-300 citizens. Parliament 
came up with detailed proposals as to the composition 
of the Conference, which is to be composed in total of 
227 members. It is interesting that the EP commits to 
a follow-up of the outcome of the Conference either 
with legislative initiatives or with even Treaty change, 
and invites the other 
institutions to do the same 
(European Parliament 
2020). 
The Commission, in a 
Communication from 
the 22nd of January 2020 
follows the same line as 
the EP on several fronts. 
Issues that cover the 
six policy areas of the 
Commission are to be 
discussed in a bottom up 
approach. The Conference 
is also to be transparent 
and inclusive (European 
Commission 2020a). The 
Commission however 
comes up with a less 
detailed proposal when it 
comes to the composition 
of the Conference (EPRS 
2020). 
The Council in turn agreed its position on the 24th of 
June and revised it on the 3rd of February 2021. The 
suggestion of the EP for citizens to debate in themat-
ic Agoras is not picked up as such (neither in the first 
nor second position). In the latter the Council stresses 
that the process needs to be inclusive, with all member 
states involved equally. This implies that a ‘large variety 
of different views and opinions’ should be taken into 
account. 
In this context, the Conference should build on the suc-
cessful holding of citizens’ dialogues and consultations 
over the past two years. 
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Commission Priority 6: A New Push for European Democracy 
In order to make the discussions relevant to citizens, 
the content of the Conference should be centered 
around several key topics, including those from the Eu-
ropean Council’s Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 (reaching 
from issues such as societal challenges to sustainabili-
ty). Note that the Commission’s priorities are not men-
tioned as a point of departure for coming up with pri-
orities. The Council changed its position when it comes 
to the chairmanship of the Conference.  In June, it still 
advocated for an ‘eminent’ European personality that 
should act as an ‘independent and single chair’. It now 
considers that the Conference could be placed under 
the authority of the three European Institutions acting 
as a Joint Chairmanship. The Conference should start 
work as soon as possible and be based on the mandate 
of a Joint Declaration by the three institutions.
As opposed to the EP, the Council consistently does not 
endorse the option that any proposals by the Conference 
could lead to Treaty change (Council of the European 
Union 2020 and Council of the European Union 2021). 
The actual start of the Conference – which was to kick-
off in 2020 - was however delayed due to the COVID-19 
Pandemic and a debate over who would chair the Con-
ference and whether the outcomes of the Conference 
should lead to Treaty change. At the end of 2020 (on the 
3rd of December) the Commission came up with its Ac-
tion Plan for Democracy to strengthen ‘the resilience of 
democracies within the Union’. The proposed measures 
are based on three main pillars that reach from protect-
ing the integrity of elections and promoting democratic 
participation, to strengthening the freedom and plural-
ism of the media as well as to combating disinforma-
tion (ZEI Monitor: EU Progress 2019-2024)  (European 
Commission 2020b).
Conclusion and Outlook 2021 
The fact that the Commission wants to provide a ‘new 
push’ to European democracy is an important signal. 
The Conference on the Future of Europe is one of the 
main pillars in this quest to prepare this democratic re-
form, inter alia bottom up. The three institutions have 
put forward their respective positions in the first half of 
2020. In substance, the EP is more ambitious and wants 
to leave the possibility of treaty change open, whereas 
the Council is not propagating this as an option and 
the Commission is presenting itself as an „honest bro-
ker“ in a middle position between both institutions. 
The Commission complemented this debate by putting 
forward an action plan on democracy with the main 
objective to update EU rules in line with the challenges 
of the digital age. 
The Conference itself has been delayed, but at the time 
of writing these lines there is a new attempt to kickstart 
the event. As mentioned above, a proposal is currently 
circulating to spearhead the Conference with a triple 
Presidency (De la Baume 2021). Hopefully this will get 
the event off the ground and indeed provide a new im-
petus for democratic reform.
Professor Christine Neuhold is a ZEI Senior Fellow, Professor 
of EU Democratic Governance and Dean of the Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Maastricht.   
ZEI Discussion Paper C 266/2021
The European Citizens’ Initiative channels citizens’ 
participation from member states to the European 
Union at an unprecedented scale. The initial ex-
pectations on it and its potentials are as “loud” as 
a “thunder”. Contrasting with the implications as-
sessed, this research finds there is only “little rain” 
dropped. Instead of concluding the instrument as 
a failure, the Union should shape the challenge as 
an opportunity to build a European public sphere 
for bringing Europeans closer to each other and the 
EU.
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